Originally posted by SlowwHand
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This is a 'multilateral' intervention (as if American interests were better served by obtaining the abstention of China and Russia at the UNSC). Not that it really matters, but the proponents of intervention consisted of the Europeans first, and only later the Americans (Asher imagines it to be the other way around, I notice).
Additionally, I certainly don't buy into the 'war machine' rhetoric Asher delights in using.
But Andrew McCarthy, in the National Review (http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262377/nro-libya-editorial-i-respectfully-dissent-andrew-c-mccarthy), has made a number of interesting points on the intervention--
1. What is the purpose? A no fly zone, or attacks on Libyan targets, or bringing down Ghaddaffi? This hasn't been articulated by the Administration. The UN Resolution doesn't articulate it past "protecting cvilians"--but air strikes have a tendency to kill civilians and a prolonged civil war will do the same, unfortunately, so this is not a tenable rationale for the intervention.
2. Why support the rebels? They seem to consist of Islamists, communists and a few secular (possibly democratic, possibly not) persons, with the latter group a small minority in comparison to the other two. In other words it may be that supporting the rebels won't lead to a positive outcome for the Libyan people, because the rebels may act quite similarly (if not as flamboyantly) as Gaddafi.
3. How does this war serve American (or broader Western) interests, in light of point (2) above? Replacing one dictator with another dictatorial regime, whose interests will, on the foreign policy scene, actually be quite similar, seems counter-productive. Islamists and communists will not be waving American flags any time soon even if we bomb Gaddafi to oblivion.
This is a summary, but it seems a reasonably well put argument. Not all of the article is about this issue however, so don't take me as endorsing everything there--just these 3 points.
Additional thoughts--
4. "Compromising" by only intervening to ensure a continuing civil war may divert both the rebels' and gaddafi's attention from other issues (and lower the terrorism threat elsewhere as a result), albeit at the cost of Libyan lives. However, once the war is over, jihadists (foreign or not) will once again focus on the West, or Western targets, or their enemies in the region. How much time will this buy us? I don't know. But it may also buy us a 'mujahadeen effect'--because at the end of it Libyan and foreign radicals will turn their sights elsewhere. It will certainly weaken Gaddafis various terror projects, but what will they be replaced with?
Perhaps this is the reason for the intervention--I doubt it.
5. What some of the commentariat are worried about, however, is that there is no end plan--that this is just a jump into the dark. Perhaps, as you argue, this is an unduly dim view to take of the strategy in Libya. For my part I'm not so sure.
(For a pro-war view, the NRO editorial in support of the war is linked to in the first words of the article)
(For a similar analysis to Andrew McCarthy's from a Democrat [James Fallows, an excellent analyst imo], see http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/on-libya-what-happens-then/72741/)
And the major point, by the way--that American intervention is wrong in principle--is frankly proven wrong by the positive effect of the American presence in Europe.
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